Russia and China Nexus: Impact on India by TALUKDAR, Indrani
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
39 
 
Russia and China Nexus: Impact on India 
 
Indrani TALUKDAR 
 
Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, India 
Email: talukdar.indrani@gmail.com 
 
Abstract:  
The growing nexus between Russia and China has created interest amongst policy makers, 
strategists and academicians all over the world. Terms such as ‘marriage of convenience’ and 
‘soft alliance’ are being used to describe the current relationship between the two countries. 
Their relationship has been developing into a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ since 2011 
with the signing of the landmark ‘friendship agreement’. The Ukrainian crisis and the territorial 
dispute in the South China Sea, respective spheres of influence for Russia and China, have 
given impetus to the partnership, after the two countries adopted congenial policy stance 
towards each other. However, there are seeds of discontentment in many areas such as in 
Central Asia, Arctic and in the initiatives such as EaEU-OBOR which brings out the 
competition within the two countries and the containment policies which though is in subtle 
form. Meanwhile, Russia-China relationship impacts India’s relationship. The R-I-C format can 
be a positive medium where all these three countries can work together and have an impact on 
peace and stability in the world.  
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The growing nexus between Russia and China has created interest amongst policy makers, 
strategists and academicians all over the world. Terms such as ‘marriage of convenience’ and 
‘soft alliance’ are being used to describe the current relationship between the two countries. 
Their relationship has been developing into a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ since 20111  
with the signing of the landmark ‘friendship agreement’. The Ukrainian crisis and the territorial 
dispute in the South China Sea, respective spheres of influence for Russia and China, have 
given impetus to the partnership, after the two countries adopted congenial policy stance 
towards each other. Fu Ying, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, said that the ‘Chinese-Russian relationship is a stable strategic partnership and by no 
means a marriage of convenience: it is complex, sturdy, and deeply rooted.’2 Russia and China 
believe that their relationship is not of convenience but of solidarity, mutual cooperation, trust 
and equal partnership, a relationship which both yearned with the West, especially Russia.   
The 2017 military report of the US where the Pentagon singled out Russia and China as the 
largest security threats has further strengthened the growing relationship between them. There 
is scepticism within the West about the construction of new security architecture by Russia and 
China along with the like-minded countries such as Iran etc. One important aspect of this post-
West world order desired by these countries is because of the grievances they have against the 
West, some recent such as China and Turkey and some accumulated ones like Russia and Iran. 
All of these countries do desire to have good relationship with the US but on the basis of equal 
partnership.  
1. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVE  
After the initial period of brotherhood based on shared ideology of communism, the 
relationship between Russia and China became contentious leading to a split in 1960 as the two 
countries started professing divergent strands of communism. The intensity of enmity between 
the two countries in 1969 was to the level of an outbreak in a nuclear war which was averted. 
By 1980s, the relationship began to thaw and since 2001, the relationship between both the 
countries has grown significantly.  
Convergences 
                                               
1 The term ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ was used in 1996 when the foundation of the ‘Shanghai-5,’ with 
the three Central Asian countries, was laid for ‘confidence building in the military field of border area’. This 
eventually evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The Shanghai-5 was for border 
delimitation. The partnership is based on equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination in the 21st century, 
which can be seen in their global and regional positions on various issues apart from their bilateral cooperation.  
2 Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow are Close, but Not Allies”, Foreign Affairs, 
January/February Issue 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-12-14/how-china-sees-russia  
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Russia and China, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, have acted on the basis of shared 
interests at the global, regional and domestic levels. There is an assimilation of common views 
at these three levels. 
Global Level 
At the global level, Russia and China’s common position can be seen in all the international 
matters—political, economical and social. Russia and China are against unilateral actions by 
any particular country and the US3 hegemony. The convergence of Russia and China along 
with the like-minded countries like Iran, Turkey and Pakistan could push towards the building 
of a post-West multipolar world order. This world order insists on mutual respect, cooperation, 
equality, non-interference, territorial integrity and sovereignty. This multilateralism post-West 
world order threatens to throw the yolk of the Western liberal order. During the 2019 Munich 
Security Conference (MSC), the European leaders including the MSC chairman Wolfgang 
Ischinger spoke about the return of the great power competition and the reconfirmation of the 
European leaders for a stronger trans-Atlantic cooperation including that of NATO and EU. 
The great power competition and the stronger trans-Atlantic cooperation most likely will bring 
Russia-China more close to each other.  
The harsh rhetoric of US against Russia and China has already helped the two countries to 
come closer. In April 2018, during a visit to Moscow the Chinese foreign minister said that the 
relationship between the two countries is at the ‘best levels in the history’ and needs to further 
strengthen it in view of various uncertainties on the international and regional agenda.4 Their 
relationship has been upgraded to comprehensive strategic partners of coordination. 
During the same visit, the Chinese minister had said that Russia and China needs to strengthen 
and prioritize coordination with each other, especially on their major policies and actions, so as 
to safeguard global and regional stability.5 With the further sanctions on Russia for the Crimea 
secession, the accusations of Moscow’s hand in Skripal poisoning and the trade war between 
US and China gives them more opportunities to construct a post-West world order by 
weakening the hegemony of the West, including the US. Russia’s ambition to regain its 
superpower status and China’s ‘middle kingdom’ concept helps the two countries to cooperate 
together despite the past history of mistrusts and the future seeds of contentment.       
The extent of Russia-China cooperation reflects in their global decisions. According to Fu Ying, 
Beijing does not have any interest in forming alliance with Moscow, nor in forming anti-West 
                                               
3Russia and China have strong opposition to the promotion of democracy by the US, its missile defence 
programmes and Washington’s plans to militarize the outer space.  On outer space, Russia and China too are 
upgrading their defense systems.  
4“China, Russia need to strengthen cooperation amid global uncertainties: FM”, XinhuaNet, March 6, 2018. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/06/c_137090788.htm .  
5Ibid. 
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or anti-US bloc of any kind.6 However, their actions are proving contrary to the statement of 
Ms. Ying, especially regarding the US. America can be hold responsible to a large extent for 
pushing each other to come close. Russia and China resolved their border issue in 2004 which 
they demilitarized in 1980’s. Resolution of the border is an important aspect to consider. The 
year 2004 has been an important year for Russia given the outbreak of the Colour revolution 
happening in Ukraine and the decisions being taken by US on Iraq and Libya, making Russia 
feel cornered in the global platform. Another reason for Moscow is the country’s focus towards 
the development of Siberia and Far East and for this resolution of the border issue with China 
was important.   
Both the countries support reforms at the UNSC in the form of increase in representation of 
countries especially the developing ones to balance the unilateral domination of the West. It can 
be seen in their opposition in the form of use of veto against West-backed efforts to impose 
sanctions and military interventions on anti-West regimes, such as their common position 
against the Western led opposition parties in Syria. On the Iranian nuclear issue7, both the 
countries resisted sanctions on the country and had called on Tehran to refrain from developing 
nuclear weapons and make its nuclear programme more transparent. During the 2011 Libya 
event, Russia and China teamed up against the NATO intervention. They emphasised on a 
political resolution rather than a military solution. They share similar views on ISIS as a great 
threat to the stability and peace to the world. They also have similar views on North Korea. In 
2016, Zbigniew Brzezinski had warned that the most dangerous scenario that would 
threaten the American security would be a grand coalition of China and Russia, united not 
by ideology but by complementary grievances.8 
Regional Level 
At the regional level, both the countries are focused on peace and stability, especially in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Instability in these regions hampers Russia and 
China’s economic ambitions, threatens the matrix of energy security, and raises the danger of 
Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and separatism within their countries, leading to a threat to 
their existing culture and regimes.  
Russia and China live under a perpetual threat because of the rise of extremism in the form of 
non-state actors, such as Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Uyghurs and Chechen Emirates, etc. The 
governments fear that these groups might invoke instability in the name of socio-economic 
inequality and self-determination. For Russia, Chechnya has been a huge challenge since 
1990’s. Since the advent of President Vladimir Putin, stability in the area was restored by 
                                               
6Ying, “How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow are Close, but Not Allies”, Foreign Affairs, op.cit.  
7 West accuses Russia and China of helping Iran in developing its nuclear programme through close cooperation 
during the 1990s.  
8Graham Allison, “China and Russia: A Strategic Alliance in the Making”, The National Interest, December 16, 
2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-and-russia-strategic-alliance-making-38727. 
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electing a Chechen Muslim rebel leader as the governor and now the president of the region. 
However, there is a tension between the Kremlin government and the Chechen rebel leader 
Ramzan Kadyrov due to the misuse of power by the latter. Tension of militancy and extremism 
in North Caucasus and Chechnya has increased due to the infiltration and fighting between IS 
and the local militant leaders. President Kadyrov has not been able to control these groups, 
which weakens the purpose of the Kremlin in supporting President Kadyrov.   
The fear of extremism within Russia is taking another form. There is rise in nationalism and 
return of Slavic Orthodoxy in the society. Ethnic tensions between russkie (ethnic Russians, 
who are descendants of eastern Slavs) and rossiyane (Russian citizens, regardless of ethnicity) 
are manifesting. It is because of the demographic changes Russia is experiencing due to the 
influx of migrants and high mortality rate because of narcotics that comes from Central Asia 
and Afghanistan. The Kremlin authorities fear that this instability between russkie and 
rossiyane, especially the Muslims, will strengthen Islamic fundamentalists like the Al-Qaeda, 
the Emirates of Chechnya and ISIS to infiltrate the country and destabilize it.  
Likewise, China has the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and rising tendency of separatism 
within its country in Xinjiang province and Taiwan. These two are the Achilles heel of China. 
The Xinjiang province is increasingly identified by jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda as the 
'occupied Muslim land'. This can heighten their aspirations and activities in this province, a 
threat to the Chinese communism. On March 2013, the Chinese officials claimed that about 300 
Uyghurs from Xinjiang have joined IS. They have been insisting on the repatriation of the 
Uyghur Diaspora and refugees. They fear that these refugees are converging with the extremist 
and terrorist groups. Beijing has expressed their concern with the Central Asian sympathisers of 
the Uyghur Muslims. The Chinese policy of repression against extremism is increasing in this 
area which will be conducive for the IS units to infiltrate deep into the country.  
Russia and China through the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) and Silk Road 
Economic Belt are engaging themselves with the region at the political, economic and security 
levels. The threats posed by terrorism and extremism are high. With the withdrawal of NATO 
troops from Afghanistan, Russia and China are reaching out to Kabul, including the Taliban, 
and Pakistan to secure their borders against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism along with 
economic dividends.  
Domestic Level 
At the domestic level, Moscow and Beijing are against regime change and are uncomfortable 
with the system of any form of opposition to their ruling system. Russia faces discontentment 
from its opposition political parties while in China opposition parties are not allowed to be 
formed.  
Due to this insecurity within the regimes, Russia and China are uncomfortable with the West 
regarding the liberal democratic values. They resent the US’ interference in their internal affairs 
or that of other countries. Moscow and Beijing follow different ruling systems – ‘sovereign 
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democracy’ and ‘one party rule’, respectively. Both the countries are against ideas such as 
democracy, human rights, etc. For example, President Putin believes that the western model of 
democracy cannot be applied to every country due to their different structures. The 
convergence of similar views between Russia and China has brought them closer.  
The Ukrainian crisis and South China Sea dispute which are seen as a provocation by the US 
has further strengthened their nexus.  
Ukrainian Crisis and South China Sea Dispute  
Sanctions imposed on energy, defence and technology have weakened Russia’s economy that 
has pushed the Kremlin to shift its focus to the East in an urgent manner 9 , leading to 
conciliatory decisions towards China. For Russia, Beijing is a source of money, investment and 
technology, such as in the energy exploration sector, etc.  
China, with its growing economic power, wants to dominate Asia and have major influence 
over the world. The expansion of its power in the East, towards the Pacific, is being hampered 
by its territorial disputes in the neighbourhood based on the ‘nine dash line’ and the US’ 
‘rebalancing’ act, creating an obstruction to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s dream of a new 
‘Asia for the Asians’. The announcement by the US President, Barack Obama, and Japanese 
Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe in February 2015 on bolstering military cooperation between the 
two countries is being seen as an attempt to contain China. Three months after US-Japan 
announcement, Beijing published its White Paper on Maritime Strategy 2015, describing its 
naval strategy of challenging the American dominance in the western Pacific, including in the 
waters around Japan and Taiwan. On July 17, Russia and China announced a naval exercise 
called Joint Sea Exercise 2015. This was conducted in both the Sea of Japan and off the cost of 
Russian region of Primorsky — about 250 miles away from Japan.  
Russia and China have engaged themselves in many joint military exercises, the latest was the 
‘Vostok 2018’.  The coming up of QUAD between India, US, Japan and Australia in Indo-
Pacific is also seen as a containing strategy by Russia and China, though India has made it clear 
time and again that it will promote a democratic and rules-based international order, in Indo-
Pacific with ASEAN at its heart that allows free access to common spaces and is not limited to 
a club of limited numbers. However, at the same time, India is clear that it will not allow any 
military development in the Indian Ocean that is not amicable to the Indian interests and to its 
safety concerns.   
Meanwhile, the growing tension between Russia and US and China and US makes it viable for 
both the countries to cooperate closer. In fact, Beijing would not want to see Russia reconstruct 
its relationship with the West or lose the battle in Ukraine, as it would strengthen the US 
                                               
9Since the days of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, the concept of Eurasia and the focus towards East was 
becoming strong in Soviet Union. Relationship with the East was always there however, 2014 accelerated the pace. 
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
45 
influence in the region. China wants to gain Russia’s support in the territorial disputes in Asia10 
and a rapprochement between Russia and Japan, which was showing positive signs before the 
Ukrainian crisis, is an anathema to the Chinese ambitions. To bind Russia with itself, Beijing is 
increasing its economic engagement through financial investments and joint projects in defence, 
space, agriculture, energy, etc. Likewise, Russia would not want China to resolve its issues with 
US and cooperate closely. There is already a talk of ‘G2’ which is not music to the ears of the 
Kremlin.    
New Synergies  
Since, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the 70th Anniversary of Victory Day Parade in 
Russia in 2015, both the countries have signed many bilateral agreements pertaining to energy, 
trade, and finance deals aimed at strengthening the economic ties.  
In November 2018, Gao Feng, spokesperson for China's Ministry of Commerce, said that the 
trade volume between China and Russia is almost touching the annual goal of $100 billion.11 
Despite the sanctions, the trade volume between Russia and China has increased. In 2017, it 
reached $87 billion. From January till September 2018, the trade reached $77 billion, raising 
the hopes of reaching the $100 billion target by the end of 2018. Undoubtedly, the trade volume 
between the two countries has increased.   
Russia and China in order to increase the trade volume are ironing out every possible irritants 
related to trade such as on other agricultural products to be exported to China. Russia exports 
oil, wood, nickel, fish, ores, slag, ash, fertilizers, wood-pulp, gems, precious metals, coins, 
plastics and organic chemicals.12 Meanwhile, China exports electronic equipments, machines, 
vehicles, coal, footwear, clothing, plastics, toys, games, iron or steel products, furniture and 
lighting, etc. 
Energy  
During the 1st Russian-Chinese Energy Forum, Russian Presindent Vladimir Putin said that 
cooperation between Russia and China has lately received significant development, including 
in the energy sector.13  
In 2017, Russia exported 40 million tons of oil and was targeted to reach 50 million by the end 
of 2018.14  Three vital projects have been signed since 2013 whose routes would be the Eastern 
                                               
10 Russia has been silent in its support to China over the latter’s territorial disputes in South China Sea.    
11“China's trade volume with Russia nears $100 billion”, Global Times, November 22, 2018. 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1128569.shtml 
12 China imports nickel, ores, etc. from the Far East region of Russia.  
13“Energy cooperation between Russian and China actively developing — Putin”, TASS, November 29, 2018. 
http://tass.com/economy/1033303. 
14“Russia’s Rosneft aims for $500bn worth of energy deals with China”, RT, November 29, 2018. 
https://www.rt.com/business/445140-rosneft-china-energy-cooperation/.  
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route, Western route and the route from Vladivostok to north-eastern China. The third project, 
Gazprom wants to link the gas-producing island of Sakhalin to Vladivostok and if successful, 
then it can further supply gas to China as well as other Asian countries, especially North Korea 
and South Korea.   
China’s oil import has been predicted to rise to 9.2 billion cubic metres per day by 2020 and 
relies on Malaysia, Russia, and West Asian, Central Asian and African countries for its supplies. 
Apart from gas, China’s growing consumption of oil has led to its energy agreements with 
Central Asia, Russia, Venezuela, Sudan, West Africa, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Canada. 
Meanwhile Russia, which is one of the largest producers of oil and gas, till the mid 2000, was 
more focused towards West. Europe was its largest importer of gas and oil.  Its relationship 
with China on energy was limited due to mutual suspicions, pricing concerns (Russia has been 
quoting exorbitant prices), inadequate transportation infrastructure and competition for 
influence in Eurasia. However, the situation has changed and growing cooperation with China 
is seen. The reasons behind the closeness are: 
• Russia needs technology to explore untapped reserves and exploit other 
deposits, which are situated in difficult geological places. China has some of 
these technologies, which they used during the construction of WEP (West-
East Pipeline) gas pipelines, which was built and routed through difficult 
geographical places (terrains, plateau and rivers).   
• Russia’s Eastern route pipeline would provide China with the source of 
secure oil if there is a standoff with the US. Beijing needs an undisrupted 
supply of energy, which Russia can provide. Russia’s Northern Stream Route 
in the Arctic Ocean is an alternative route for China in future.  
2. COMPETITION AMONGST THE REGIONAL GROUPINGS: TPP-TTIP, 
EEU AND SILK ROAD BELT 
The regional groupings are another area, which is bringing Russia and China closer. Both the 
countries are not part of the US’ led twin projects—the  Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)15 and 
the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  
Through the TTIP, the US wants to block Moscow’s influence as America is focusing on the 
markets of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, etc., which have greater 
market potential than the matured one in Western Europe.  Though under CPTPP and without 
US on board, one needs to wait and see how this group unfolds its strategy. It is because under 
                                               
15Though US, the founding member of it, has withdrew its membership under President Donald Trump however, 
the rest of the members have gone ahead with a new version of the pact, known as the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).  
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TPP, the strategy of America was to contain China by dominating the markets in Asia. To 
counterbalance these two US led groupings, Russia and China have established their own.  
Russia has established the EaEU along with Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Its vision is to 
form a free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok, including members such as India, New 
Zealand, Egypt, Israel and the EU, etc. If successful, then it will balance the TTIP.   
China saw the TPP as an attempt to counter its economic might in the region. In response, 
Beijing has initiated economic agreements westward covering East Asia and the South Pacific. 
It has combined diplomatic and economic initiatives in the form of One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
that comprises of Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 
21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR); the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB); 
the revival of the Free Trade Area of Asia and the Pacific (FTAAP) initiative, China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the intensification of bilateral partnerships with its neighbours. 
These initiatives will help China have influence through the Gwadar Port; new oil and gas 
pipelines from Myanmar to Kazakhstan; and new industrial and commercial rail links spanning 
from Western China to Europe. The EEU and China’s various initiatives, such as Silk Road 
Belt, AIIB have brought Russia and China together. Both the countries want to dominate their 
regions through economic initiatives. They also have a common ambition to curtail the US’ 
dominance over their markets. Hence, finding mechanisms to cooperate through the forums of 
EEU, OBOR, BRICS, SCO, etc., Russia and China want to mark equal footing in the markets 
everywhere including the West. To further enhance the economic engagement, Moscow has 
become one of the founding members of AIIB.   
Central Asia 
Central Asia is considered as the backyard of Russia and it sought to consolidate the 
relationship through regional integration initiatives, such as the CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States), the Customs Union and the EEU. Meanwhile, China, with growing 
demands of energy for its development, has established strong relationship with the region. It is 
the largest trading partner with a trade volume of $46 billion till 2012.  It is keen on Central 
Asian oil and gas because of their quality and low price.  
Before the Ukrainian crisis, Russia had an ambivalent position towards China’s growing 
presence in the region. Moscow was happy with Beijing’s quest for cheap gas from the region 
as the former was interested in the European markets. Secondly, both countries opposed the 
presence of the US military in the region, leading to the removal of US military bases from 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  
For China, its relationship with Russia is crucial as it wants uninterrupted energy from Central 
Asia. It understands Moscow’s influence over the region. It also does not want to take the 
challenge of protecting security in the region by involving deeply from the military perspective. 
It would rather invest the money in the economic engagement and leave the hardware security 
issues to Russia.  
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China is also reluctant to open military bases in the region for the fear of provoking anti-
Sinofication which is simmering strongly. It has taken an adroit stand by cooperating with 
Russia rather than annoying it. It would not want to open a two front conflict with the US on 
one side and Russia on the other. Nevertheless, Beijing’s growing presence in both investments 
and domination of these markets are making Russia uncomfortable. In the SCO Ufa Summit 
2015, Russia was silent on the SCO development bank16 and the use of SCO to link EEU with 
OBOR. Moscow has been reluctant to support the creation of the SCO development bank as 
China would be the main contributor. With the standoff with the West, Russia was planning to 
support these two initiatives after the latter agreed to include Moscow’s Trans-Siberian and 
BAM17 railways in the scheme. However, the creation of the bank is on hold. However, Russia 
has expressed its keenness in linking EaEU with OBOR.   
Russia has realised that China has taken over as the biggest external economic power. In order 
to maintain its presence, Moscow is trying to bolster the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) as a security provider and the EEU at the economic front. The 
sustainability of the relationship between Russia and China are questionable, given the covert 
competition involved between the two countries. 
3. SEEDS OF DISCONTENTMENT WITHIN THE NEXUS 
The areas where the relationship might be tested are in Central Asia, Far East and Siberia, Asia-
Pacific and in EEU-OBOR. The areas of divergences are:  
Central Asia  
Russia and China have been cooperating in maintaining stability in Central Asia, whose energy 
supplies are vital for both the countries’ economic development—China uses it for its domestic 
developments while Russia resells Central Asian hydrocarbons in third-party markets. Moscow 
enhances the quality of its own petro products by blending them with Central Asian oil. For 
example, it blends its oil with the Kazakhstan oil, which is rich and smooth in quality. The rich 
quality of petro products of these countries will hamper Russia’s markets. Central Asia is a 
potential competitor and strengthening of relationship between China and them would 
strengthen the insecurity within Russia, leading to use of force by the latter. There is tension 
between these countries and Russia as they are unhappy with the development of the EEU and 
are also facing the brunt of the weakening of rouble value. They are interested in joining the 
Silk Road Belt than the EEU. Also, with the signing of the Convention on Caspian Sea between 
Russia and the other member states, things will be problematic. Russia faces difficulties in 
                                               
16Russia fears that China might follow the US’ behaviour in international financial institutions if Beijing is allowed 
to be the dominant stakeholder.   
17The Transsiberian and the Baikal-Amur railroads projects are yet to be taken off. The delay has been due to 
many bureaucratic challenges within the Kremlin government.    
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maintaining its monopoly with the emergence of other Caspian Sea members as well as Central 
Asian players and the US.  
China is comfortable with its deals with Central Asian, Latin American and African countries, 
as they offer low price in comparison to Russia. However, growing closeness would irk Russia. 
To divert Beijing’s businesses from Central Asia, Moscow is pressing China for the 
development of the Western route18 through the Altai pipeline, but the latter is more interested 
in the Eastern route.19 This route provides secure oil to China that further develops the centre-
of-economic-gravity which is in the eastern part of the country. The route also provides an 
alternate supply line from Central Asia.  
Russia is not happy with China’s control over the negotiation on the prices of energy. Due to 
the availability of huge market opportunities for exporters, Beijing is able to quote the price. 
Given the weak economic situation, Moscow is bending to the rules of China as it needs the 
cash; however, when the situation becomes normal, then the former might revert back to its old 
way of ‘oil monopoly’.  
The untapped energy reserves of China would be a bone of contention as it would reduce its 
dependency, specifically on Russia, due to the latter’s quotation of high price. Beijing would 
want to maintain close ties with Central Asia because of the latter’s good quality and lower 
price rather than Moscow. Meanwhile, most of the reserves in Russia have matured and the 
level has depleted. The new reserves, which are to be explored, are situated in difficult 
geographic terrains and with the sanction on technology; it is not able to explore it. China has 
the technology, which can help explore in difficult geographical regions. It might demand more 
access to these untapped fields in Russian territories, leading to further expansion of Chinese 
presence in these areas.  
CSTO 
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which was established after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union can be an area of future discontentment between Russia and China, given 
the latter’s growing influence in the region. The foundation of CSTO has been shaky due to the 
discontentment amongst the members where Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan have not 
renewed their memberships. The members are not happy with the dominating position of 
                                               
18Though in September, Russia and China have agreed to get approval for gas supplies via the Power of Siberia’s 
‘western route’ in the shortest possible time. “Moscow, Beijing to agree gas supplies via Power of Sibe ria’s 
‘western route’ shortly”, TASS, September 12, 2018. http://tass.com/economy/1021135. In the same month, Russia, 
China and Mongolia also agreed on exporting gas through Mongolia to China, opening up another avenue for 
Russia’s pivot to East.  
19“Russia’s gas pivot to Asia: Another false dawn or ready for lift off?” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
November 2018, pg.6. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Russias-gas-pivot-to-
Asia-Insight-40.pdf 
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Russia in terms of funding and deployment of military manpower20 and the clause where 
Moscow has the right to unilaterally veto the placement of foreign military bases on the 
territory of a CSTO member. The challenge would be if the members of the CSTO who are also 
members of SCO, prefers the latter. Amongst the officials there is a proposal of merging 
CSTO-SCO21 given their similar fundamental agendas of combating terrorism, extremism and 
separatism. The convergence might be a challenge in the future due to the dynamics involved 
within the region such as the bilateral relationships shared between the CSTO members with 
China. The SCO’s economic component is growing at an increasing rate and Central Asian 
countries who are closely involved with China prefer Beijing over Russia.  
China is the dominating power in the SCO22 and would not want Russia to overpower Beijing’s 
growing clout in that region, given its ‘marching West’ policy. With its aggressive desire to 
link OBOR with these countries, it would not want Russia’s interference in any dominating 
forms be it CSTO or EEU. Increase in China’s role is uncomfortable for Russia. It does not 
want its position to be weakened or the alliance of the rest of the members of CSTO to shift. 
Moscow has lot in stake in terms of the military and industrial complex in the region as it is the 
supplier of defence equipments to these countries and has close energy links of oil and gas.   
Talks are going around of China being the ‘bank’ and Russia ‘the big gun’ in the region. The 
ISIS menace and Russia’s ambition to further its influence in Indo-Pacific might bring CSTO 
and SCO together but the competition to overpower each other would be there.  Addition to it, 
the ambitions of the Central Asian states, including their balancing game with the external 
powers based on these five states convenience and also the desire to resolve the internal 
problems within them and uniting together for the region’s development complicates the 
situation and make the region volatile. These states might exploit its membership in EaEU and 
OBOR. In SCO, it might be little difficult given the expansion of the organisation.   
Far East and Siberia 
This is another area which has the potentiality of contention due to the interests of both the 
countries. For Russia, increase of China’s presence in the Far East and Siberia has made the 
former concentrate in this area since 200923. Chinese companies were not allowed to buy the 
‘strategic’ oil and gas deposits by Russia. The Russian authorities opposed Chinese 
participation in infrastructure projects and in automobile markets because of the fear of Chinese 
dominance through investments, products and workers in the region. Moscow fears the 
                                               
20The defence equipments used by the CSTO member states are Russian made military hardware.   
21“Interview: CSTO head eyes closer partnership with SCO”, New China, June 8, 2018. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/08/c_137239917.htm.  
22Though with the membership of India there might be weakening in Beijing’s clout.    
23Other foreign investors are yet to show enthusiasm due to some problems in the region despite the Kremlin 
authorities making it a business friendly environment. The problems are the small population, lack of sizeable 
internal regional market and high labour costs. Till these are resolved, Russia has to struggle with the presence of 
Chinese companies.   
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presence of the Chinese workers, as it will lead to an increase in the unemployment of the 
natives. Xenophobic sentiments are already on the rise within the Russians against the Chinese 
‘Sinification’.  
A future threat for Russia might be due to the growing presence of Chinese Uyghurs who 
relates their ethnic ties with the region. Another front of extremism and separatism for Russia 
might open up due to the presence of them. Russia is already facing similar problems through 
the Chechen Muslim separatists and ethnic tensions between russkie and rossiyane, especially 
the Muslims from Central Asia and Afghanistan. The presence of the Uyghurs will complicate 
Moscow’s relationship with China. Beijing has not been forthcoming in its policies of counter 
terrorism and separatism with other countries. For example, it remains silence towards 
Pakistan’s support to the non-state actors’ activities in other countries such as in India.  
For China, the Far East and Siberia are crucial as this region was a part of Beijing during the 
19th century. The Chinese officials use the term ‘lost territories’ frequently in reference to the 
loss of Far East and Vladivostok. The reference of ‘lost territories’ might be creating insecurity 
within the Kremlin circle as Vladivostok was taken from China by the Czar empire through the 
Treaty of Beijing in 1860. For Russia, the region is vital as it gives access to the Asia-Pacific.24 
Beijing might take advantage of the presence of Uyghurs in the future to counter Russia.    
Taiwan and Xinjiang  
China is sensitive about Taiwan and Uyghurs in Xinjiang province. Russia shares a cordial 
relationship with Taiwan. It considers Taiwan as an integral part of China, having signed 
Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy and does not support political and diplomatic contacts with Taipei. 
However, Russia has economic and humanitarian ties with Taiwan. From strategic point of 
view, Taiwan can provide a base of economic and military utility to Russia in future given its 
geographical position which falls in the routes of South China and East China Seas. Moscow 
wants to mark its presence in this region and relationship with Taiwan can be of advantage in 
the future for both its power status and also to balance China in the region.  Xinjiang remains a 
vulnerable point for China. A counter balance is in play. Russia is uncomfortable with the 
presence of the Uyghurs in Far East and region and Siberia while China might become wary of 
Moscow’s nationalistic fervour which might lead to the increase in ‘Sinification’. Russia has a 
positive economic relationship with the Xinjiang province and the trade volume between them 
has risen to $2.15 billion in 2014. Although Moscow would be careful not to stoke separatism 
in China; however, to protect its national interests in that region and its ambitions, it might take 
advantage of the situation within Beijing. Also there is the historical angle of the ‘great game’ 
attached to Russia’s interest in this province. During the initial phase of the Soviet Union’s 
period, Xinjiang featured importantly in economic and strategic matters. For Russia, this 
portion was vital for the protection of its southern and eastern flanks from Turkic and Islamic 
                                               
24Gordon G. Chang, “China and Russia: An Axis of Weak States”, World Affairs Journal, March/April 2014. 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-russia-axis-weak-states.    
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upheavals. Economically, the region has been rich in natural resources. Soviet Union had used 
the ethnic divisions to its advantage.25   
Indo-Pacific  
The current shift of global power and developmental potential towards the East, primarily to the 
Indo-Pacific region, the Indian Ocean region and the Arctic region might become areas of 
discomfort between Russia and China given their national interests.   
Russia’s relationship with the Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and 
Vietnam are positive. To further strengthen it, Moscow is trying to engage these countries 
through the EEU’s FTA, arms deals, nuclear civilian cooperation and energy engagements. It is 
also trying to develop its Northern Sea Route in Arctic region which will help Moscow to have 
an alternative route to reach to Indo-Pacific. It would open up Russia’s northern side that will 
help in spurring economic and social development from Kamchatka to Kola.  
Russia’s vision in signing the EEU FTA with Vietnam is complimentary to its strategy of 
linking Arctic Sea with Indo-Pacific. For Moscow, Vietnam is the key pivot point of Southeast 
Asia, as it occupies key shorelines connecting the Strait of Malacca with North East Asia. The 
country is accessible by sea to Russia’s Far East ports. Additional route via the Northern Sea 
route will enhance Russia’s accessibility to the Asian markets via Asia-Pacific. Moscow is 
trying to rejuvenate its ties, such as with India and Bangladesh through defence and civil 
nuclear cooperation, and establishing new relationships with countries, like Pakistan. With 
Pakistan, Moscow gets the access to the Gwadar and Karachi ports which would be beneficial 
for its commercial and military activities respectively for the port facilities. Cooperation with 
these countries would help in linking its Northern Sea Route with the Indo-Pacific through the 
International North South Corridor (INSTC) route, giving a wider access.  
Since the last few years, Russia is trying to actively propagate its ambition in this region and 
increase its activities. Apart from energy, nuclear and arms deals, other ideas which are floating 
are expansion of food production in southern Siberia for the Asian market; engaging with Asian 
countries in scientific and technological cooperation; and internationalizing Russia's 
educational system through closer links to Asian universities. Currently, Russia’s ambitions in 
Indo-Pacific are in nascent stage due to the lack of a coherent strategic policy. However, if 
these initiatives are successful then it would be hampering China’s ambitions in the region.  
EaEU-OBOR  
Although EaEU and OBOR are enthusiastic about their cooperation; however, the increase in 
the presence of these institutions in each other’s spheres of influence, such as China’s OBOR 
initiative in Central Asia leading to Europe and the EaEU in Asia-Pacific, will not be conducive 
                                               
25Mark Dickens, “The Soviets in Xinjiang: 1911-1949”, Oxus.com, http://oxuscom.com/sovinxj.htm . 
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in the future. Though Russia has supported OBOR and has agreed to link EaEU with OBOR 
however the strategy is to contain China26. At the same time, OBOR is also a strategy to 
contain Russia’s power in Eurasia. Hence, the urgency in promoting EaEU with the Asian 
countries is to balance China’s growing presence in Central Asia as well as Moscow’s need to 
counter the US. The signing of the FTA between EEU and Vietnam and being in the process of 
signing it with India and New Zealand signify the future of Russia’s strategy.  
Other areas of discontentment might be in defence, finance and future projects such as the 
North South Corridor.  
Defence 
Defence is another area where past contention might erupt. The foundation of China’s military-
industrial complex was laid by the Soviet Union’s industries. It was done through the licensing 
of technology, the transfer of assembly kits and the provision of advisors. However, with time, 
China has been able to catch up with the Russian state-of-art models. Russia was upset over 
China copying the designs of Moscow’s state-of-the-art military technology. The two countries 
have addressed these issues and have agreed on new contracts since 2016. However, with deals 
like S-400 missile systems and Sukhoi SU-35 fighter aircrafts between Moscow and Beijing, 
China might use it against Russia, for example, in Vladivostok. It might also take over the 
Russian arms export markets by producing defence weaponry and selling it low prices. The 
outer space and cyber space are other areas where there can be trouble in future. Currently, both 
the countries are cooperating in both these fields through their joint space projects and anti-
hacking pact, but given the suspicion about each other’s ambitions, it might create an 
unfriendly atmosphere in the future.  
Finance 
Russia and China have started to transact their bilateral trade in their national currencies in 
order to lessen the dependency on the dollar and the euro. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry 
Medvedev during his October visit to China predicted that the trade volume between Russia 
and China is expected to reach $200 billion through their trade in local currencies. Talks are 
going to allow the use of China’s Union Pay credit card in Russia and Russia’s Mir card in 
China.27 However, there might be future limitations to it.  In the international market, dollar is 
still the medium of transaction as well as the powerful currency (despite everything) and it is 
doubtful about other currencies such as renminbi and rouble taking over in the near future. 
Between Russia and China, despite the currency swapping, future problems would be the 
imbalance in the rate exchange. Due to the strength of renminbi in comparison to the rouble, 
                                               
26Also in reality, the agreements been signed between both the countries through these two initiatives are still on 
paper. Nothing much is happening in the ground reality.  
27Karen Yeung, “China and Russia look to ditch dollar with new payments system in move to avoid sanctions”, 
South China Sea Monitor, November 22, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-
economy/article/2174453/china-and-russia-look-ditch-dollar-new-payments-system-move 
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China will benefit than Russia. The non-convertibility of the renminbi would be another major 
barrier.   
Economic 
Despite the sanctions, the trade volume between Russia and China has increased. The energy 
sector is also booming between the two. There are heavy investments from Chinese side in 
Russia. The trade war between China and US is helping Beijing and Russia comes closer. 
However, given the flux in international relations as well as the two countries ambitions, things 
might be in a cautious mode. Though hypothetical but if relationship of these two countries 
improves with US then there might be a change between Russia and China.   According to a 
confirmed source28 from Russia, most of the agreements between Russia and China are in paper 
and not in reality.   
Arctic 
China has been an active player in the Arctic region meanwhile; Russia is a natural inheritor of 
it. In its Arctic policy, China has stated itself as a ‘Near Arctic State’. It has also expressed in 
building a ‘Polar Silk Road’ there. It is keen in participating in the governance of the region 
apart from the other areas of scientific, economic and energy areas. It spoke about participating 
in accordance with the basic principles of ‘respect, cooperation, win-win result and 
sustainability’29 however, given its trajectory on unilateral claims such as  in South China Sea 
and the developments in Arctic, the readings of this Arctic policy goes beyond. For Russia, it 
will be a trouble though it is upgrading its defence capabilities and its claims in the region. 
Though far-fetched, but if China becomes powerful in South China Sea and also becomes 
successful in claiming its near Arctic then it will be able to contain Russia in Eurasia including 
in the maritime domain in the Arctic.  
International North-South Corridor 
Russia, India and Iran are cooperating closely on INSTC. The project is parallel to China’s 
East-West Silk Road project. The growing nexus between Russia-India-Iran would be 
uncomfortable for Chinese ambitions. Though there are problems within the project which are 
emerging such as Iran inviting China and Pakistan to invest in INSTC30  however if these issues 
can be ironed out than this corridor will help not only India but also Russia to strengthen its 
Greater Eurasian Project (GPE) and EaEu. It will open a market to the West and East.  
The relationship between Russia and China to a large extent is been strengthened due to global 
and regional challenges along with anti-US hegemony. It is a ‘marriage of convenience’ with 
                                               
28The Russian expert under Chatham House rule answered to a statement that the author had made that Russia’s 
Greater Eurasian Project (GPE) is a containing strategy towards China and OBOR’s to EaEU.  
29“China’s Arctic Policy”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 2018. 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 
30India is not happy with Tehran over the invitation to China and Pakistan to invest in INTSC.  
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China seemingly the dominant partner. However, the ambitions of both the countries to play an 
influential role in the international system would become checks and balances over each other. 
Both the countries are fighting for the same strategic, geopolitical and resource based 
objectives. In this context, India’s perspective on this nexus is important given its relationship 
with both the countries.     
4. IMPACT ON INDIA 
India is observing the relationship carefully despite the divergences present in the axis. Russia, 
China and India are members of BRICS and are closely associated through other multilateral 
organisations, such as Russia-India-China (RIC), SCO and recently AIIB, etc. However, 
concerns are becoming more. 
India shares a ‘special and privileged’ partnership with Russia. However, there are problems 
faced within the bilateral relationship such as the latter’s growing relationship with Pakistan 
and the former’s with the US is not keeping the relationship satisfactory. For India, closer 
relationship between Moscow and Islamabad makes the situation uncomfortable given the 
bilateral challenges India faces with both countries. A growing nexus between Russia-Pakistan-
China would not be music to New Delhi including from the security perspective. During the 
February 2019 R-I-C meet, Russia, India and China agreed to cooperate more closely to 
counter the threat of terrorism and extended their support to New Delhi on counter-terrorism 
however, they did not support India’s stand on Pakistan being supporting state sponsored 
terrorism activities in Indian soil including the Pulwama attack on February 14.  
Another area of discomfort for India is Russia’s support to the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) and Beijing’s OBOR. Moscow supports this initiative as it believes that this 
project will help Pakistan’s economy and also help in regional connectivity. Though given the 
special and privileged relationship between India and Russia, it is near to impossible however, 
given the shift in the international scenario, including New Delhi’s growing relationship with 
America, Russia can play a spoil sport by using CPEC in a covert manner as a containment 
strategy against India in the future depending on the relationship between India and Russia.31  
New Delhi faces more trouble as Iran has invited Pakistan and China to invest in the 
development of the Chabahar port, a move which Moscow supports. For Russia, development 
of this port along with the development of the multilateral economic initiatives helps the 
country to develop its own EaEU. India cannot support CPEC nor OBOR because these 
initiatives impinge on the territorial sovereignty of India. New Delhi has also been questioning 
the transparency of the OBOR project. The discomfort of India, including the investment of 
Islamabad and Beijing in Chabahar port, is because of the trust deficiency between India-
                                               
31Though India is not against Russia having relationship with any third country vis a vis Russia. Also, New Delhi 
knows that Moscow is sensitive towards the former’s security concerns however, the growing relationship between 
Russia and Pakistan, including in the defence sector, does not go well with India.  
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Pakistan-China. Though there is cooperation between these three countries and with SCO being 
a common platform things should turn for good however, for the time being it has not been the 
case. With the Pulwama attack and China not declaring Masood Azar of Jaish-e-Mohammad,32 
the terrorist group living in Pakistan, the trust quotient for India towards these two countries is 
low. Addition to this, the border dispute between India and China still stands, which would be 
difficult to be resolved in the near future.  
Meanwhile, Russia and China have their own concerns with India regarding the latter’s 
relationship with the US. With QUAD coming up and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
giving the ‘JAI’ acronym to the partnership between Japan, India and US, Moscow and Beijing 
have been uncomfortable, which will increase in future if these two countries do not get space 
to manoeuvre in this part of the region. For example, China is trying its best through its proxy 
presence by investing in countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port etc. to 
position itself in this region. At the same time, China eyeing the Northern Sea Route in the 
Arctic is also to an extent to bypass the Indo-Pacific route though this passage remains vital for 
Beijing. The growing relationship of Russia with Pakistan and China can also be attributed to 
the  factor of (future) non-accessibility apart from its economic and strategic interests in this 
region. 
Another area of concern for India is its membership in the UNSC. Russia supports New Delhi’s 
membership, while China has objections regarding it. The delay in India’s membership in the 
UNSC shows a deep rooted skepticism within Russia and China. For China, it is not 
comfortable as it wants to regain its primacy to veto as the only Asian country in the UNSC. 
India’s membership will dilute the power of Beijing and might affect the decisions if both the 
countries do not share the same view and approach on any challenging issue at both global and 
regional levels.  
Although Russia supports India’s bid to the UNSC33, the encouragement has not taken any 
pragmatic form, such as a strong bidding amongst other UNSC members and pushing harder 
for the inclusion of New Delhi swiftly. One reason behind this covert inertia might be India’s 
closeness with the West, especially the US.34 There might be discomfort within the Kremlin 
about India being pressurized by the West, especially the US against Moscow in global and 
regional challenges though recently New Delhi was able to not come under pressure from 
America regarding sanctions on Russia and Iran, however there might be discomfort within 
Moscow regarding India.  
In the Ukrainian crisis, India has maintained an independent and prudent position of resolving 
the challenge through inclusive and peaceful dialogue amongst the contesting parties. Russia 
                                               
32 Though China had to relent with the international pressure on listing Mr. Azar a terrorist  
33The basic question which needs to be addressed by the P5 is that whether they genuinely want to share the power 
with others or not.    
34Another reason for Moscow is Japan. India’s membership leads to the others such as Japan and Germany.  
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has held New Delhi’s position in high esteem. The West and the US have been unable to 
pressurize India in imposing sanctions on Russia. However, a sense of fear might be looming 
within Moscow. Also, Russia, like China, might be uncomfortable with the sharing of veto 
power with India at the UNSC.  
5. POLICY CHOICES FOR INDIA  
Maintaining a strong, transparent and balanced relationship with Russia and China is beneficial 
for India. At the same time, India needs to build its relationship with other powers in the 
neighbourhood such as Japan, South Korea and Australia etc. A balanced, independent and 
non-bloc relationship through a multivectored foreign policy will help India to strengthen its 
position in the international relations. The country is a fast-growing economy and has shown 
the capability of taking over China in the near future.  
India’s growth is important because of its multilateral engagements. Though New Delhi is for a 
multi polar world order and shares the same vision with Russia and China however it is clear 
that it does not want to be in any anti-West group. India is growing into a country where it 
wants to take along all countries together without forming any bloc or alliances (apparent in its 
deals with the West as well as with Russia and China). In creating an inclusive world, India, 
Russia and China can contribute in the following, despite the mistrust and contentious issues: 
• Global climate change is a real threat; these three countries can come up 
with projects such as to preserve forests such as in Far East and the fauna in 
the Arctic.   
• Cyber threat is another area where these three countries can work together 
to build a system against attacks. They should bring other countries such as 
US, Japan, South Korea, France and Germany in the team. 
• Outer space is another area where these three countries can contribute in 
lunar and Mars missions. India and Russia have restarted their cooperation in 
this sector. 
• Water crisis is going to be a huge issue affecting the security and stability 
in the region including between India and China. They must address this issue. 
• Cultural exchanges and educational exchanges especially in the level of 
strategic community in the R-I-C format as well as in a multilateral format will 
be important where subjects like international order, post-West order, global 
climate, nuclear disarmament, terrorism etc. should be discussed and come up 
with recommendations for the governments. 
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The R-I-C format can be a good format which can contribute in both the traditional and non-
traditional security aspects. However, the format has to be non-biased and based on mutual and 
genuine understanding. Lot of confidence-building measures need to be initiated.  
However, there are some caveats in these trilateral engagements.  
Caveat in Trilateral Engagements  
• Given the all-weather relationship with Pakistan, it would be difficult 
under the R-I-C format to go for an anti-terrorism project as China does not 
acknowledge Pakistan’s involvement in encouraging non-state actors. The 
recent standoff between India and Pakistan where China and Russia asked 
both the countries to restrain themselves and stay calm fell short in asking 
Pakistan to stop using its proxy terrorist groups against India. Beiing did not 
declare Mr. Azar as a terrorist. Partnering seriously with India, not just in 
papers but also in actions would open up complications between Beijing and 
Lahore whose repercussions China would not want to face. Similarly, Russia’s 
growing relationship with Islamabad will restrict its manuevoruing powers. In 
the 2018 Qingdao declaration of Shanghai Organization Cooperation (SCO), 
all the members, including India and Pakistan, in the joint statement noted that 
use of ‘terrorist, extremist and radical groups for one’s own purposes are 
unacceptable’. It called for the implementation of treaty on long-term good 
neighbourliness, friendship and co-operation.35 However, it failed to achieve 
the goals. 
• Russia and China’s anti-America attitude (for the time being) hinders the 
prospect of trilateral engagements. India’s growing relationship with US does 
not go well with Moscow and Beijing.  
The relationship between India, Russia and China has the capacity of contributing peace and 
stability in the world. However, the national interest, mistrust and strategic ambitions within 
each other and against each other make the positive prospects weak. Much depends on the 
leaders of the states. For the time being, all the three leaders are willing to circumvent the 
problems to a large extent and work together towards common goals of cooperation and 
development but how long remains to be seen.  
                                               
35“Qingdao Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”, Shanghai 
Organization Cooperation, June 10, 2018. 
file:///C:/Users/Dr%20Indrani/Downloads/Qingdao_Declaration_2018.pdf.https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm? 
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On Russia and China relationship, it is heartening to see their partnership in an upswing mode 
in global and regional levels. Both the leaders support each other and maintain a non-
interference attitude in their domestic policies. The actions of US have helped in bringing the 
two countries closer. International relations are viewed from the prism of realpolitik and zero 
sum game. However, the areas of discomfort which the two countries shares and in future 
might become strong caveats in this relationship.  
With globalization and advancement of information and technology that has developed the 
economies of the countries, has also become the genesis of non-traditional security issues—
terrorism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic xenophobia, climate change36, water scarcity and 
natural calamities, etc, posing grave danger to all countries. Hence, dialogues based on 
persistent confidence building measures—transparency, respect and understanding of each 
other can bring India, Russia and China together and have a rippling effect on the international 
system.   
India’s position, given its relationship with US; its special and privileged partnership with 
Russia and its prudent as well as balanced relationship with China, can help in the future of 
building a balanced, inclusive and not chaotic global multipolar world order.   
 
                                               
36Those these three countries talk about climate change and India and China area also a part of Paris Agreement 
but ground reality speaks contrary.  
